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In this paper we consider a standard policy game between the Government and a union. In such a framework, we 
first investigate the effects of corporatism on macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis different kinds of non-co-
operative equilibria. Afterwards, we introduce in the literature the issue of the feasibility of corporatism, i.e., 
whether and under what conditions it is in the interest of both agents to implement a corporatist approach to 
economic policies. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social 
welfare, since it often reduces the union’s utility. In particular, we show that a micro-founded union will never 
find it profitable to co-operate with the Government, unless side-payments are considered. The study of this last 
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Corporatism is an ambiguous concept, which has been defined in a variety of ways. In this 
paper we focus on one specific aspect of the corporatism and define it as ‘institutional 
arrangements that involve negotiation, bargaining, collaboration and accord between major 
economic groupings in the society, and especially, for our present interests, between unions 
and governments’.
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1 This largely corresponds to definitions of ‘corporatism’ in Cameron (1984) and Bruno, Sachs (1985) and is the 
same as Cubitt’s ‘Corporatism 4’ (see Cubitt, 1995) and the definition of the term given by Burda (1997). This 
definition of corporatism stresses the nature of ‘the rule of the game’ whereas other definitions can refer to the Recent policies of some European countries demonstrate the prevailing trend for the 
unions to become more actively involved in the formulation of policy both at the national and 
at the European level. At the national, regional and company levels unions have become more 
and more involved in drawing up employment pacts aimed at safeguarding or creating 
employment. The Social Democrat/Green German government, for example, was recently 
able to revive the idea of an employment pact leading to a new national alliance for jobs 
which includes the formation of a tripartite body. Similar pacts and labour market policy 
reform agreements have also been reached at national and regional levels in countries such as 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.
2  
Co-operation between governments and trade unions is thus a reality in a number of 
European countries, in particular in those with a tradition of social-democratic government. 
The richness of practical cases of co-operation is however in sharp contrast with the reduced 
number of theoretical analyses aimed at checking its benefits and the conditions for its 
feasibility.
3 
An initial attempt to show these benefits was made by Tarantelli (see Tarantelli, 1982; 
1986; and 1987), who argues that co-operatively determined wages ensure the same 
disposable income for wage earners while resulting in a higher level of employment and a 
reduced inflation rate. He presents no formal model in relation to this statement, but 
strengthens it by some empirical tests. 
After Tarantelli only a few papers and books have appeared on the subject. Among 
them there are Bruno, Sachs (1985), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Acocella and Ciccarone 
(1995), Cubitt (1995), Burda (1997), and Di Bartolomeo (2001). The common result obtained 
by these papers is one of (sometimes) conditional positive effects of co-operation on both 
inflation and unemployment, much in Tarantelli's vein. The effects of co-operation depend on 
a number of assumptions (e.g., see Burda, 1997). A crucial role among these is played by 
specification of the objectives of both governments and unions. 
The starting point of our paper is closely related to Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) and 
Cubitt (1995), who consider implicitly or explicitly the same definition of corporatism used in 
our paper.  Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) show that joint maximisation of the union 
preference function, quadratic in real wages, income and price stability, and the government's 
utility function, quadratic in both income and prices, implies zero inflation, while maintaining 
an unemployment bias. Cubitt (1995) finds the possibility of reducing unemployment 
conditional on a sufficiently high bargaining power of the government while having reduced 
inflation, by initially assuming preference functions of both players quadratic in income and 
inflation. 
We first show that positive macroeconomic consequences on unemployment and 
inflation can be derived from co-operation between the union(s) and the government under a 
broad spectrum of assumptions, including the type of non co-operative solution considered as 
a benchmark for assessing the consequences of corporatism and the type of the union 
preference function. But the main purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis of 
corporatism to issues of feasibility, i.e. of acceptability of this institutional device. Analysis of 
the macroeconomic performance of a corporatist system in terms of employment and price 
stability is important. However, superiority of the macroeconomic performance of 
                                                                                        
number of existing unions (the degree of centralisation of wage setting) or to the values of their objectives or the 
weights put on them (see Cubitt, 1995).  
2 See OECD (1997), Visser (1998), Traxler and Kittel (2000) and Rhodes (2001).  
3 The ‘formal reticence’ of researchers to develop models of corporatism is noticed also by Burda (1997), who 
relates it to the remarkable imprecision with which the concept is defined. The reticence is even more 
pronounced with reference to the kind of corporatism we are interested in in this paper. corporatism does not guarantee that corporatism will be accepted by the parties involved, in 
particular by the union. In fact, the union preference function includes an additional variable, 
the real wage rate, which tends to be inversely related to employment. The higher level of 
employment guaranteed in many cases by corporatism raises the union utility level, but since 
it implies a lower real wage rate, it can finally reduce the union preference. The analysis of 
feasibility represents a novelty, since generally previous papers only consider the 
macroeconomic consequences of corporatism without checking its feasibility.
4 We show how 
feasibility is strictly conditional on the weights of different objectives in the preference 
function of both the union and the Government. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the structural model of the economy, its 
reduced form and the preference functions of the two agents are presented. According to the 
recent literature both the cases of a union microfounded preference and an inflation 
augmented one are considered. In section 3 three non-co-operative and one co-operative 
(corporatist) regimes are described and infation and unemployment rates associated with them 
derived. In section 4 the values, and their effects on social welfare, of unemployment and 
inflation associated with the corporatist regime are discussed. Section 5 analyses the 
conditions for acceptability of corporatist solutions to both the government and the union. The 
next section relates these results to questions of neutrality of monetary policy.  The final 
section presents our conclusions and some general final remarks.  Robustness of 
macroeconomic consequences of corporatism with respect to union preferences is also 
analysed in an Appendix. 
 
   
2. The model of the economy and the preference functions of the agents 
   
We consider a model that is a generalisation of Acocella and Ciccarone (1997) and an 
extension of Di Bartolomeo (2001). There are two agents in our closed economy, a monopoly 
union and the Government. In our economy we consider only one policy maker, who takes 
care of both employment and price stability. In a more complex setting, like the o ne 
considered in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2002), both one government (or more than one 
government) and the central bank are present. Some of our conclusions could not hold in such 
a more general setting.  In fact, even if the objectives remain the same, the presence of two 
separate public agents, each one of them having an independent instrument available, can 
change results. The reason why we refer to a very simple setting is to show that robustness of 
conclusions derived by using policy games should be checked against possible changes in 
either the model or the information setting.  
The economy is described in a very simple way by the system of equations (1), where 
all variables are in logs:  
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D lamp =-  
()
S lbwp =--                                                                                                  (1) 
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where 
D l  and 
S l are, respectively, aggregate demand and supply (in terms of employment), m 
is the nominal money supply, w is the nominal wage and p is the price level. By hypothesising 
some “prior” level of prices, we may talk of inflation and current prices interchangeably 
(Cubitt, 1995: 247). 
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where u is the unemployment rate and  n  is the given labour force. 
The preference functions of the Government and the union are, respectively, indicated 













app =-----                                                          (4) 
 
where  1 pp p - =-  is the inflation rate;  1 GG pp p - =-and  1 UU pp p - =- are the players’ 
desired values of inflation (pG £  pU); nG and nU are the desired values of employment of the 
two players (nG ‡ nU ). Government’s utility depends on inflation and employment, whereas 
the union utility depends on the same arguments and on the real wage. For a more accurate 
description of such functions we refer to Acocella and Ciccarone (1997) and the references 
there contained. Here we would like only to note that the union preference depends on 
inflation, if  0 J „ .
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With reference to the economy described in the previous section, we consider four possible 
regimes labelled by numbers running 1 to 4. Three non-co-operative regimes are compared to 
a co-operative one.  
  We first present the standard Nash non-co-operative regime (regime 1), which is also 
our benchmark. In this regime, the union and the Government simultaneously set the nominal 
wage rate and the nominal supply of money, which maximise, respectively, the union’s and 
the Government’s preference function. Then firms set the labour demand and outcomes can 
be computed.  
Afterwards, we consider two sequential games (solved by sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium). In the first such game the Government is able to pre-commit its policy (fixed 
monetary rule regime, i.e. regime 2), whereas in the second the union sets its wage in advance 
taking account of the government’s reaction. This regime corresponds to a standard game 
where the union, given its nominal wage, sets its expectations and the Government acts by 
                             
5 The reasons why unions may be interested in inflation are indicated by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) (see, 
however, Acocella and Ciccarone, 1997, for arguments against the inclusion of inflation in the union preference 
function) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999). using a discretionary monetary policy (discretionary monetary policy regime, i.e. regime 3). 
The timing of the game associated with regime 3 is described in the following figure.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Discretionary monetary policy regime 
               
   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1)￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(2)￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(3)￿￿ ￿ ￿ ﬁ 
  The union sets the 
nominal  wage 
The government set 
the monetary policy 
The firms set the 
labour demand 
 
               
 
 
Clearly, the timing of regime 2 is obtained by reversing the order of point 1 and 2 of figure 1. 
The outcomes of the three non co-operative regimes are then compared with the corporatist 
solution (regime 4), which is our main object of study. In fact, in line with Robin Cubitt’s 
definition of ‘Corporatism 4’ (see Cubitt, 1995), we define corporatism in a very restrictive 
way as the solution of a co-operative game between the Government and the union.
6 
The co-operative solution is defined as the joint maximization of a convex 
combination of the two players’ utilities (see, e.g., Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1994; or Cubitt, 
1995). Our analysis is restricted to this co-operative solution concept for two orders of 
reasons. First, we aim to compare our findings to the existing literature, which widely uses, 
implicitly or explicitly, this solution concept to formalise the definition of corporatism we are 
interested in. A second order of reasons is shortness since conclusions similar to those we 
derive can be obtained by using either the Nash bargaining solution or the Kalay-
Smorodinsky one. The reason of our generality should be found in the introduction of 
feasibility. In fact, the main difference between the co-operative solution used here and those 
just mentioned is the absence of the non-negativity constraints in the latter.  However, as we 
assume an extra requirement for our solution, namely feasibility that is the inclusion of the 





The Nash non co-operative regime (regime 1) 
   
The Nash non co-operative solution is obtained as follows. Maximising the preference 
functions of the two agents with respect to their control variables (m for the Government and 
w for the union) subject to the reduced-form model of the economy (2) gives the following 
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The reader should note that, with no loss of generality for our purposes, in order to 
make it easier u nderstanding the model, we have assumed that the desired values of 
                             
6 See also, among others, Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Cubitt (1995), and Di Bartolomeo (2001). 
7 More proofs and numerical examples are available upon request.   employment and inflation of both agents are n and zero, respectively. We also assume that all 
the marginal rates of substitution are finite and positive, unless differently stated. 
The Nash non co-operative solution with respect to control variables is obtained by 
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By substituting the latter equations into the reduced form we have the equilibrium 
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The fixed monetary rule regime (regime 2) 
   
The solution of the game can be easily derived backwards by maximising the Government 
preference function subject to the reduced form and (6) as well. This results in the following 
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From equation (12) and (13) the Nash perfect sub-game equilibrium values of the relevant 
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Discretionary monetary policy regime (regime 3) 
   
The solution is derived in a way similar to that of the previous section, by maximising the 
union utility function subject to (5) and the reduced-form model. This results in the following 
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By substituting these values into the reduced form, we have the following sub-game 





























                                                                                       (21) 
 
 
The corporatist regime (regime 4) 
 
The corporatist solution is obtained by maximising a linear combination of the preference 
functions of the two agents: 
 
(1) BU WWW gg =+-                                                                                     (22) 
 
where parameter  g ˛ (0, 1) is an indicator of the bargaining power of the Government (Di 
Bartolomeo, 2001). Furthermore, the solution to the problem must satisfy some non-negative 
condition (i.e. the utility of both players under the co-operative solution must be higher than 
their utility under the non co-operative solution). In this section we will abstract from this 
issue that will be analysed in Section 5. 
The value of each control variable in terms of the other control variable derived from 
the process of maximisation can be expressed as follows:  
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The optimal values of target variables are then:  
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The reader should note that the co-operative solutions for employment and inflation 
are independent of the degree of inflation aversion of the union.  Inflation is however 
independent of the players’ inflation-aversion, simply because both players can reach their 
common bliss point. With different bliss points, equilibrium inflation would be a weighted 




4. Effects of corporatism on macroeconomic outcomes and “Social Welfare”  
 
In this section we investigate the effects of corporatism on some macroeconomic variables 
(more precisely, on inflation and unemployment) by comparing the equilibrium outcome 
associated with the co-operative solution with those associated with the non-co-operative 
regimes. By introducing some simplifications that are standard in the literature, the analysis of 
the outcomes will enable us to make some considerations about the effects of corporatism on 
social welfare. 
  Let us first consider the case in which the union is inflation-averse ( 0 J > ). In this 
case, all non co-operative solutions show a positive inflation rate, whereas the corporatist 
regime implies zero inflation. Therefore, when the union is inflation-averse, only the co-
operative solution guarantees the lowest possible (i.e., zero) inflation. In economic terms this 
might mean that, when the union cares about inflation, corporatism would eliminate the 
inflation bias due, in the terms of Barro and Gordon (1983),
8 to the lack of credibility of non-
                             
8 This is not a dynamic model; however, the equilibrium values derive from an implicit dynamic adjustment 
through the reaction functions of the players. Therefore, we can speak of credibility in the following sense: the 
union, even when it is at its optimal point in terms of the real wage-employment trade-off relation, will push the 
nominal wage (rising inflation) to the left of the point in which the Government will not react to its strategy, i.e. 
the point in which further increases in money supply to deflate the real wage are not credible (because of the loss 
for the Government's utility).  inflationary monetary policies when the Government has also an objective in terms of 
employment.  











                                                                                           (30) 
 
This value is lower than that corresponding to the Nash co-operative regime represented 
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This means that the non co-operative solution for unemployment (employment) tends to 
be lower (higher) than the co-operative one the higher the union inflation-aversion, the lower 
the inflation aversion and the bargaining power of the Government.
9 
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Conditions (32) and (33) can be commented in a way similar to (31). 
By comparing the equilibrium unemployment values given by (11), (16) and (21) we 
notice that when the union is inflation-indifferent, non co-operative unemployment is always 
(i.e. in any non co-operative regime) equal to a/b and that inequalities (31), (32) and (33) are 
never satisfied. Therefore, when the union is inflation-indifferent, unemployment in the co-
operative regime is always lower than in any non co-operative one. By comparing the 
equilibrium inflation rates (10), (15) and (20) it follows that when the union i s inflation-
indifferent, the co-operative equilibrium price level is the lowest possible. Summarising, 
when the union is inflation-indifferent, the co-operative solution is socially Pareto dominant 
with respect to all the non co-operative regimes, in the sense that it reduces any social loss 
function that is increasing in unemployment and inflation. 
In other terms, when the union is indifferent to inflation, the proposition according to 
which corporatism guarantees an equilibrium that is Pareto superior to the non co-operative 
solution is robust to the different non co-operative solution regimes. This kind of result is 
common to those obtained in settings similar to ours (see Cubitt, 1995; Cukierman and Lippi, 
1999; and Di Bartolomeo, 2001).  
                             
9 The reader can easily check that   (, ) / >0 bJJ ¶G¶  and   (, ) / <0 bJb ¶G¶ . Then for any given g, the r.h.s. of 
equation (31) is higher the higher is J  and the lower is b.   In the case of an inflation-averse union the positive effect of corporatism on 
unemployment depends on a comparison between the inflation aversion of the union and that 
of the government. When the former is relatively larger than the latter, the corporatist regime 
achieves an unemployment rate lower than that associated with the non-co-operative regimes 
(regimes 1, 2 and 3). Inflation is always lower in the corporatist regime vis-à-vis all non-co-
operative regimes, if the inflation aversion of the government is higher than the union’s. 
The above results, however, may be dramatically affected by the feasibility issue since 
corporatism, even when it is associated with a higher level of social welfare, may fail to raise 
the utility of one of the two players, in particular the union. This would make the co-operative 
solution unfeasible. The next section will investigate questions of feasibility. 
 
 
5. Effects on the players’ utilities: Is corporatism feasible? 
 
Feasibility of corporatism involves comparing the agents’ utilities associated to corporatist 
outcomes with the utilities the agents derive in the case of a break of bargaining (non-negative 
conditions). The first problem that we must face in this case is the determination of the 
agents’ outside options. The most intuitive candidates for the outside options are the non co-
operative solutions, but it is also possible to consider a different outside option, as in the case 
of a binding contract with penalties imposed by law. However, this case is less interesting 
since the outside options would be exogenously given. Therefore, we will focus on the non 
co-operative solutions as outside options.     
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where W
C are the utilities associated to the corporatist solution values (e.g. pC, lC, etc.) while 
W %  are the utilities associated to the breaking bargaining values of the agents’ target variables 
(e.g.  p % ,  l%  etc.). As said above, our outside options are the utilities of the non co-operative 
regimes. 







p =---    (38) 
 
Then, after some simple algebra, the non-negative condition for the union can be derived as 
follows:  
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This expression is the sum of two terms: the first measures the impact of the unemployment 
rate while the second measures the impact of inflation. 
First consider the simplest case: a union indifferent to inflation. From the previous 
section, it is unambiguous that corporatism increases the policy-maker’s utility. Then the non-negative condition for the government is always satisfied. Therefore, the feasibility question 
is only related to the unions’ outside option. When  0 J = , u takes the same value for all the 
non co-operative solutions considered. Therefore, the condition of non negativity for the 
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  < 0   (40) 
 
In this case, the corporatist solution seems to be not feasible. However, notice that co-
operation improves the policy-maker’s utility, thus making it possible to grant transfers to the 
union. Later we will take this point again. 
More generally, i.e., if  0 J > , we can also re-write the union non-negative condition 
(39) as: 
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Let us analyse the different cases.  
First notice that  ( ) 1 u
b
a
g Øø +- Œœ ºß
%  is positive for all non co-operative solutions. Let us 
assume  C uu > % . In this case - which tends to hold for high values of the union inflation-
aversion and low values of the Government bargaining power and inflation aversion - the 
non-negativity condition for the union is satisfied, but the one for the policy-maker does not 
necessarily hold. On the contrary, if we assume  C uu < % , the non-negativity condition for the 
policy-maker always holds, whereas the union’s one can hold only if the union puts much 
emphasis on price stability  
Thus a union neutral with respect to  inflation or with a low preference for price 
stability is not interested in co-operating with the government, since this would lower its 
utility. However, co-operation unambiguously increases the policy-maker’s utility. Therefore, 
there could be an interest for the policy-maker to compensate the union for the reduction in its 
satisfaction deriving from acceptance of corporatist solutions implying a lower wage rate. A 
mechanism of transfers in terms of public tariffs, higher pensions, welfare state provisions,
10 
etc. might be devised.  
These transfers could be used by the policy-maker for a political exchange to gain 
union’s co-operation, a possibility already emphasised by Tarantelli (1982) a long time ago 
when he proposed to link a housing price regulation and other real wage-enhancing policy 
measures to wage bargaining (see also Acocella and Ciccarone, 1995).  
However, our model cannot take account of transfers and side payments and 




                             
10  On this point notice that in the last year trade unions have assumed the role of the “last defender” of the 
Welfare State in several countries. 6. Feasibility of corporatism and non-neutrality of monetary policy. 
 
The results obtained in the previous section need some explanation. Let us consider the case 
of an inflation-neutral union first. In a framework like ours this makes monetary policy 
neutral, i.e., the equilibrium level of employment does not depend on the government’s 
preferences (Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1994).
11 The Government cannot influence the game 
outcome in terms of employment (or real wage). The union can always maximise its 
preference function without being conditioned by its opponent.
12   
Alternatively, one could say that in the case of a union neutral to inflation, its preference 
function can be expressed in terms of real wages or employment only. Since the Government 
cannot influence employment (and real wages) in this case, the union can always get full 
satisfaction, being unaffected by monetary policy. Co-operating with the Government can 
thus add nothing to its satisfaction. 
Assuming an inflation-averse union, monetary policy is no longer neutral. It can thus 
influence the unemployment level and be geared according to the regime. In particular, in the 
co-operative case, the Government can create externalities for the union and thus improve the 
union’s level of satisfaction.  
Let us refer to the two possible sub-cases envisaged in the previous section and consider 
first the sub-case where corporatism involves an increase in unemployment. The union’s 
preference will certainly rise whereas the Government will be satisfied only if it put a very 
high weight on the price objective. In this sub-case, although corporatism is feasible, it might 
not induce a social welfare improvement since the weight of the social welfare function may 
be different from the Government’s inflation aversion.  Second, when the corporatist solution 
is associated with a level of unemployment lower than those of the non co-operative regimes, 
it is always feasible for the Government (and it is always a social improvement), but the union 
non-negativity constraint will be satisfied only for a (relatively) high degree of inflation-
aversion.  
In both sub-cases the reason of the results has to be found in the non neutrality of 
monetary policy that characterises the game when an inflation-averse union is assumed. In the 
non-co-operative regimes, since monetary policy is not neutral, the employment level is no 
longer the first best for the union but will be lower according to how much the Government 
takes account of inflation (which is the cost that the Government now faces when reducing 
unemployment). Therefore, a corporatist solution associated with unemployment rates higher 
than those of the non-co-operative regimes definitively raises union’s utility both because of 
the higher unemployment (that raises the overall utility associated with the real wage and 
employment) and the lower prices that are always associated with a corporatist regime. On the 
contrary, corporatist solutions associated with unemployment rates lower than those resulting 
in the non-co-operative regimes have an ambiguous effect on the union utility, since the low 
unemployment tends to decrease it whereas the lower prices have an opposite effect. The 
prevailing force will depend on the relative weight that the union puts on price stability. 
Ceteris paribus, the higher is the union inflation aversion, the higher is the gain of utility with 
respect to the cost and, therefore, the likelihood of the corporatism to be feasible.       
Our results are rather robust since our claims have been tested against different non-co-
operative regimes and different specifications of the union preference in both arguments and 
form (see, e.g., the Appendix to this paper). In addition, other analytical and numerical 
                             
11 The issue of neutrality is more extensively discussed in Acocella and Ciccarone (1997), Acocella and Di 
Bartolomeo (2002). 
12 In other terms, the union will be able to set a level of nominal wages such as to maximise its real wages 
subject only to (1) exercises, not reported here but available on request, show that results are also rather robust 




In this paper we have analysed questions concerning both the macroeconomic performance 
and feasibility of corporatism. A specific aspect of corporatism has been considered (i.e. the 
co-operation between the Government and the union). This kind of co-operation has often 
been observed in recent years, but, apart from some exceptions, it has been little studied.  We 
have first compared the macroeconomic effects of corporatism with those associated to 
different non-co-operative policy regimes by considering its effects on inflation, 
unemployment and social welfare. We have also tested our result with respect to many 
alternative assumptions. Afterwards, investigating the feasibility of the corporatist solution we 
have introduced a novelty with respect to previous studies. 
Regarding the macroeconomic effects of corporatism, in our setting we can remark the 
following three observations. First, corporatism always succeeds in lowering inflation vis-à-
vis all types of non co-operative solutions. Second, when the union is indifferent to inflation, 
corporatism also results in a level of employment higher than in any non co-operative 
solution. Third, when the union cares about inflation, superiority of corporatism in terms of 
employment is more likely to be guaranteed the higher the relative bargaining power and the 
inflation-aversion of the Government and the lower the union's degree of inflation aversion. 
We might then argue that in our macroeconomic setting (where employment is an 
inverse function of the real wage), if the union does not care about inflation, corporatism 
always has positive consequences on both inflation and unemployment. Then, the corporatist 
solution is always Pareto superior with respect to all the non co-operative regime, i.e. it 
reduces any social loss function increasing in unemployment and inflation. The implications 
of co-operation for employment are indeterminate when the union, in addition to real wage 
and employment, has inflation as an argument of its preference function; inflation, however, 
would always be lowered by co-operation in the case of such a preference function, since it is 
(one of) the objective(s) of the Government. 
Although these conclusions are robust to both different non co-operative solutions and 
union preference functions either quadratic or linear in real wages, they are rather difficult to 
be of practical relevance unless feasibility of corporatism is taken into account. Our analysis 
has shown, in fact, that acceptability of corporatism by the parties involved is always 
conditional since it implies satisfaction of appropriate conditions that are derived from the 
non-negative constraints imposed for both the union and the Government.  
The corporatist solution is in fact not feasible if the union is indifferent to inflation. Due 
to monetary policy neutrality, the union is fully satisfied with non co-operative solutions and 
would gain nothing from corporatism. 
On the contrary, when the union cares about inflation corporatism has more chances to 
be feasible. Monetary policy is no longer neutral. The union is thus not fully satisfied with the 
outcomes of non co-operative games. In addition, it shares with the Government the objective 
of price stability. A possibility then arises of a fruitful co-operation with the Government. 
Feasibility is however associated with very strict constraints.  
Corporatism then seems to be compatible with the following scenarios. First, it is likely 
to be feasible when the union is inflation averse and the Government has a relatively high 
inflation aversion. In this case a relatively high (low) unemployment (inflation) rate would be 
associated with the corporatist solution. Second, corporatism is feasible in a scenario where 
the union largely dislikes inflation. Third, in a scenario where the union does not care about 
inflation (or it does so moderately) a complex transfer system might exist. In this c ase feasibility is not guaranteed in terms of the macroeconomic outcomes we have considered and 
the only way to support the corporatist solution would be through a compensating system of 
transfers from the Government to the union, which might however be difficult to design. 
We conclude by emphasising two possible lines of future research. One is related to the 
analysis of conditions which in real situations favour the emergence of pre-conditions for 
corporatism in terms of union’s preferences. From this point of view one could test the 
prediction stemming from our analysis that corporatism can only arise from union’s sharing 
of common objectives with the Government (in our case inflation), apart from employment. 
Another line of future research is related to the explicit modelling of a transfer system, which 
could be done by inserting taxation and money transfers in the model or considering an issue 
linkage approach. The latter approach, largely used in environmental policy, seems to be very 
promising and particularly suited for our context.  Appendix – Robustness to union preferences 
 
All our claims also hold for a union preference function quadratic in the real wage, 
employment and, possibly, inflation. This is the case considered by Gylfason and Lindbeck 
(1994). Since these authors are interested in questions of monetary policy neutrality, they 
stress the result that corporatism does not eliminate the unemployment bias, while doing so 
for the inflation bias. However, it is easy to show that in their model the unemployment level 
– while still being positive – is lower in the co-operative case, if the union cares only about 
the real wage and employment. For simplicity, here we will show co-operative and non co-
operative results in terms of unemployment only, since Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994)
13 do 
not stress such results. 
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By subtracting (A2) to (A3) we get that the condition for the co-operative unemployment 
solution to be lower than the non co-operative one is the same as (31). In the case when the 
union does not care about inflation, equation (31) can never be satisfied: also for a union 
preference function quadratic in the real wage, the co-operative solution is Pareto superior to 
the non co-operative one. 
                             
13 Other results are available upon request. References 
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